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STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case
No. 6375

GRANT ALLEN ADAMSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court,
Salt Lake County, Utah
Hon. M. J. Bronson, Judge, Presiding

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant, Grant Allen Adamson, was charged
with the crime of Involuntary Manslaughter and after a
trial to a jury was found guilty of that offense. The
following are the facts as produced at the trial of this
ease:
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Shortly after 8 :00 P. ~{. on August 8, 1940, Karl
Moulton was just driving out of a drive-in ice cream
parlor, located on Second West Street between Third
and Fourth South Streets in Salt Lake City, Utah.
(R. 72, 73.) Two trucks proceeding southerly, side by
side, on said Second West Street attra~ted his attention.
(R. 73.) There are four lanes of traffic on this street
(R. 100) and the trucks were on the two right hand
lanes. The truck nearest the center of the road was a
gasoline truck (Exhibit" A" is a picture of it). (R. 74.)
The defendant was driving this truck (R. 85). The
other truck was a truck and semi-trailer with timber on
it. (R. 73, 74.) Moulton followed these trucks south to
Ninth South Street. While following them he paced them
to determine their speed. ( R. 74, 82.) He checked their
speed by his speedometer. They were travelling between
35 and 38 miles per hour. (On direct examination Moulton testified they were travelling between 38 and 40
miles per hour. (R. 74, 75.) On cross examination he
admitted that on preliminary hearing he testified that
these trucks were traveiling between 35 and 38 miles per
hour. (R. 80.) He also testified on cross examination
that it had been some time since he had had this matter
brought to his attention and that he had testified on the
preliminary hearing possibly a week after the accident.
(R. 79, 80.) As the trucks approached the intersection
of Second West Street with Ninth South Street the green
light of the semaphore at that intersection was in their
favor. The truck with timber on it went straight on
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through the intersection and the gasoline truck made a
left hand turn to go east on N"inth South Street. (R. 75.)
:J[oulton testified that he could not say exactly but what
this truck did slo'v to so1ne extent in making this turn.
(R. 75.) He further testified that there was absolutely
no way of telling how much he slowed down (R. 80) and
that he believed that in the preliminary hearing he testified that the gasoline truck slowed down appreciably on
arriving at the corner. (R. 80.) ~Ioulton intended to
turn to the left but as he crossed the pedestrian lane he
saw the accident. (R. 75.) He saw some object fly up
in the air and light on the pavement. It was Sylvester
Kanon.
Sylvester Kanon was on a bicycle travelling in a
northerly direction on Second West. As he passed the
southeast corner of the intersection he was travelling
about two feet from the curb. (R. 84.) There was an
impact between Kanon and the truck driven by the defendant. Officer R. T. Anderson made measurements
on this intersection immediately after the collision and
from metal marks and red paint marks he determined
the probable point of impact as being on a li~e with the
east curb line of Second West Street and forty-four feet
into the intersection from the south curb line of Ninth
South Street. (R. 99.) (These measurements are indi<'ated in Exhibit "B," a n1ap drawn by the officer.) The
ilnpact occurred in the north half of the intersection. The
IH)( ly of Kanon came to rest 18 feet due east of the point
of iu1pnct ancl the bicyele :15 feet from that point of im-
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pact in a south-easterly direction. (R. 99.) Defendant's
truck proceeded east on Ninth South Street 157 feet from
the point of impact before it stopped. (R. 100.)
This intersection is a well-lighted intersection. A
service station is on the southeast corner and one is on
the northeast corner. The lights of both of these stations
were on at the time of this collision. Also there is an arc
light on the southwest corner which was on at this time.
(R. 83, 84.)
Dr. Eric Simonson exan1ined Kanon upon his arrival
at the County Hospital. It appeared that Kanon had
massive fractures of the occipital and parietal bones.
these were crushed and loose. The third and fourth ribs
to the right of the sternum were broken. Blood was running out of his right ear. There were several fractures
of the pelvis. The skin was evulsed from the upper part
of the left arm exposing the muscle. Kanon was dead
on arrival. (R. 94.)
An examination of the truck driven by the defendant
discloses that there was a long scratch mark in the center
of the bumper having the appearance that it had come in
contact with metal, the grill was bent and milk was
spilled all over the windshield and left fender. R. 108109). From an examination of the intersection it appeared that there were no skid marks or tire marks of any
kind. (R. 107.) The testimony of one of the police
officers showed that Second W e'st Street north of Ninth
South is 83 feet wide and south of Ninth South Street
is 45 feet wide. The east curb of Second West Street
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south of Ninth South Street is 22 feet further west than
the east curb line of said Second 'Vest Street north of
Xinth South Street.
One of the defense 'Yitnesses testified that he
stopped on the southeast corner of this intersection of
Second \\Test and Ninth South Street just as the semaphore light for north and south bound traffic was changing from red to green. An automobile was waiting for
the light to change in order to proceed north on Second
West Street across said intersection. Upon the light
changing the automobile proceeded across the intersection. The defendant's truck was coming south on Second West Street. The Kanon boy, on a bicycle, passed
by this witness going North on Second West Street and
his attention was next called to the intersection by a
crash which he heard, and upon looking North he saw
the Kanon boy going down betvveen the cab and the
serni-trailer.
Based upon the foregoing evidence the jury in this
case found that the conduct of the defendant evinced a
marked disregard for the safety of others and that he
was guilty of the crime of Involuntary Manslaughter as
charged in the inforrnation.
POINTS IN\TOL\TED
The defendant has assigned twenty errors. The
errors relied upon are classified under two headings;
~-,irst, that the evidence was insufficient to support the
verdiet; and second, errors were cornmitted in instructing
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the jury. The State will follow the order these points
are taken up in the brief of appellant.
From the following argument we believe that it will
conclusively appear that the evidence in this case was
sufficient to support the verdict of the jury, and that
there was no prejudicial error in the instructions given
to the jury or in the refusal of the trial court to give
certain requested instructions.
ARGUMENT
1. THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN
THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT FINDING THE DEFENDANT GUILTY _OF THE CRIME
OF INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER.
Instruction Five (R. 43), given to the jury, sets forth
in five paragraphs three unlawful acts and instructed the
jury that if they found that any one of the unlawful
acts had been committed by the defendant that they could
take them into consideration in determining the guilt of
said defendant. These three unlawful acts were: (1)
Driving at an excessive speed; (2) failing to yield the
right of way and; (3) reckless driving. It was upon these
acts that the case was submitted to the jury and if there
is any substantial evidence showing that the defendant
committed any one of these unlawful acts and his conduct in so doing was reckless or evinced a marked disregard for the safety of others then the verdict of the
jury must be upheld. The State bases this contention
upon the fact that the defendant took a general excepSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tion to the "\Yhole of Instruction Five. We believe that
there "\Yas substantial evidence on all three of these
unlawful acts and sufficient upon "\Yhich the jury could
make a finding of their commission.
a.

The Defendant ·s Speed.

Section 37-7-16, Chapter 48, Laws of Utah 1935 was
1n force at the time of the commission of the crime
charged in the information in this case. It is not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant was going
at any particular speed in miles per hour. Those statutes
provide as follows :
''On all public highways, it is unlawful for
any person to drive a vehicle upon a highway at
a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent,
having due regard to the traffic, surface and
width of the highway and the hazard at intersections and any other condition then existing.
Nor shall any person drive at a speed which
is greater than will per1nit the driver to exercise
proper control of the vehicle and to decrease
speed or to stop as may be necessary to avoid
eolliding vvith any person, vehicle or other conveyance upon or entering the highway in compliance with legal requirements and with the duty
of drivers and other persons using the highway
to exercise due care;"
Counsel for the appellant limits his discussion entirely to the miles per hour which the defendant was
going at the intersection of Ninth South Street and
Second West or whether or not he was going slow or fast
\vithont taking into consideration the surrounding cirSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cumstances. Counsel states that he cannot determine
from the evidence where it was on Second West Street
between Third South and Ninth South Streets that the
defendant was driving between 35 and 40 miles per hour.
We believe that a fair interpretation of the testimony of
Moulton is that he followed the defendant from the ice
cream parlor to Ninth South Street and during that time
he paced the defendant. (R. 74.) We submit that it is
a reasonable interpretation of this testimony that the
defendant maintained this speed until making the turn
at the intersection of Ninth South and Second West
Street, at which time he slowed down in making that
turn. The witness testified, of course, that he could not
tell exactly how much the defendant had slowed down.
However, the jury could have taken into consideration
the fact that the defendant's truck was driven a distance
of 157 feet from the point of impact before he brought
it to a stop. The jury could also have considered the
force with which Kanon was struck. This is evidenced
by the various injuries which he received. The evidence
indicates that the bones of his skull were crushed and
two ribs were broken, there were several fractures of
his pelvis and the upper part of his left arm was severely
injured.
As indicated by the foregoing statute, the jury could
take into consideration the traffic on the highway and
the hazard at the intersection and any other conditions
therein existing in determining whether or not the defendant was driving at a speed which was greater than
was reasonabla and prudent. We submit that t]Je eviSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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dence indicates that the defendant "'"as not keeping a
proper look-out. The intersection 'Yas well-lighted as
heretofore indicated. It is apparent that the defendant did
not see the Kanon boy inasmuch as no skid marks were
made indicating an application of the brakes to avoid a
collision. It does not appear that the defendant turned
in any manner in atten1pting to avoid this collision. He
just sailed into the intersection, making a left hand turn,
in the face of oncoming traffic, and after hitting the
Kanon boy finally came to a stop 157 feet east of the
point of impact. We submit that coming into an intersection, protected by a semaphore light, and making a
turn in the face of oncoming traffic at almost any speed
could well be found an unreasonable speed by the jury,
especially where a vehicle in that oncoming traffic was
hit by the vehicle making such turn.
When we consider the size of this truck that was
being driven by the defendant and his inability to bring
it to a stop in less than 157 feet, impresses one with the
fact that going through this intersection as he did the
defendant must have been going at a speed which was
greater than was then and there reasonable and prudent
within the meaning of the statute heretofore quoted.
One of the defendant's duties was to determine
whether or not he could make this turn without endangering oncoming traffic. He cannot be heard to say that
he did not expect traffic to be coming toward him. Del'ense testimony indicates an automobile had just passed
through the intersection. It was defendant's duty 'to
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see if there was any traffic coming toward him in a
northerly direction. If he was going at a speed which
would prevent him from stopping or turning out to avoid
such oncoming traffic then his speed was not reasonable
and prudent. If he was not looking to determine if such
traffic was coming in a northerly direction then, of
course, any sped would not be reasonable or prudent.
We submit this evidence also indicated that the speed
of the defendant was greater than would permit him to
exercise proper control of his vehicle and to decrease
speed or to stop to avoid persons or vehicles on the
highway.
The case of Dunville vs. State, 188 Ind. -373, 123
N. E. 689 (1919) is not helpful to the Court in determining the question of whether or not this defendant violated the speed statute of this State. The evidence in
that case indicates that the deceased, a little girl, ran
into the street in front of the defendant's motorcycle
and the defendant was unable to avoid hitting her ... a
very different thing than making a left hand turn at an
intersection, the traffic of which is enough to require the
placement of a semaphore light to aid traffic.
In the Dunville case it could well be said that the defendant could not expect a child to run out into the street
in front of his motorcycle. In the case at bar we have an
intersection collision and the defendant ran into oncoming traffic which he might well expect to be there.
Appellant does not think that any assumption can
or should be drawn from the fact that defendant's truck
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,n?nt a distance of 157 feet from the point of in1pact be-

fore defendant brought it to a stop. And why not~
Certainly upon running into somebody the most usual
thing for a person to do, if he 'Yas in complete possession
of his faculties, would be to bring his automobile to a
e think the jury might well
stop as soon as possible.
infer that the truck 'Yas brought to a stop as soon as
the defendant could do so. The absence of skid marks
proves nothing other than the defendant did not see
Kanon 'vhom he should have seen.

'T

Counsel cites State rs. Gutheil, 98 Utah 205, 98 Pac.
(2) 943 and asks 'vhat it was that Adamson did or did
not do that shows that he acted recklessly and in marked
disregard of the rights of others. The simple answer to
this question is that the defendant, without keeping a
proper lookout, made a left hand turn at an intersection
in the face of oncoming traffic and disregarded his duties
by failing to determine :whether there was any oncoming
traffic before making that left hand turn and in crossing
the intersection in the manner in which he did and not
being able to stop his truck before it had gone 157 feet
beyond the point of impact.
.Appellant contends that there is no evidence that the
defendant failed to keep a proper lookout. From the
evidence in this case he did not see the Kanon boy. We
<'an reasonably infer this from the fact that no effort was
n1ade by the defendant to stop or to turn out before the
point of i1npact. The Kanon boy was in the path of the
<lefenclnnt 's trnrk. We can reasonably infer this from
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the fact that he was hit. He should have been seen by
the defendant. We can reasonably infer this from the
fact that the intersection is well-lighted. The defendant
had a duty to determine the presence of oncoming traffic
because he was turning in the face of it. We submit
there is evidence that the defendant made this turn without keeping a proper lookout. This should be taken into
consideration in determining whether there is any substantial evidence that the defendant violated the speeding statutes of this State.
b. The defendant failed to yield the right of way to
Sylvester Kanan.
The statute on right of way provides as follows,
57-7-31, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933:
''The driver of a vehicle within an intersection intending to turn to the left shall yield to
any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is within the intersection or so close
thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard, but
such driver having so yielded and having given
a signal when and as required by law may make
such left turn, and other vehicles approaching the
intersection from the opposite direction shall
yield to the driver making the left turn.''
Counsel for appellants contends there is no substantial evidence that defendant violated this statute.
Defendant was driving a vehicle within the intersection of Second West Street and Ninth South Street. He
intended to make a left hand turn at that intersection.
This is evidenced by the fact that he made such a turn.
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The statute, under such circumstances, imposed upon
him a duty to yield to any vehicle approaching from the
opposite direction if that vehicle w·as "\vithin the intersection or so close thereto as to constitute an immediate
hazard.
Is there any evidence showing that Kanon's bicycle
came within this statute and 'vas entitled to the right of
way? Kanon and his bicycle were hit by the front of the
truck driven by the defendant. The probable point of
impact was four feet north of the center of Ninth South
Street and on a line with the east curb of Second West
Street. T. A. Fowler testified that he looked north, saw
the truck of the defendant approaching the intersection,
looked back and Kanon "\Vent by and then he heard the
impact. (R. 118.) This is certainly substantial evidence
that at the time the defendant intended to make the left
hand turn Kanon was either in the intersection or so
close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard. A
jury could reasonably infer that both defendant and
Kanon were entering the intersection at about the same
time and could find that the defendant, in failing to yield
to Kanon, violated the foregoing statute.
Apparently counsel for appellant seem to think that
if the defendant yielded to the Ford which just preceded Kanon across the intersection that he could then
proceed to make his left hand turn and Kanon 'vould
have to yield to defendant. Under this statute the defendant before making a left hand turn would have to
.ri(~I<l to every vehicle coming in the opposite direction so
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long as such vehicle was either within the intersection
or so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard.
There is evidence that defendant slowed down to some
extent but that he continued to make the turn. In order
to obtain the right of way the defendant, in addition to
the above, would have to give a signal as required by law
in making a left hand turn. There is no evigence that he
gave such signal.
We submit that there is substantial evidence which
would support a finding that the defendant violated the
foregoing statute.

c. The evidence supports a finding that the defendant violated the reckless driving statute.
The first and second paragraphs of Instruction Five
sets forth the reckless driving statute (57-7-15, Revised
Statutes of Utah 1933) and the jury by that instruction
were permitted to deliberate upon the proposition of
whether or not the defendant violated that statute.
The conduct of the defendant in driving into the
oncoming traffic at the intersection of Second West
Street and Ninth South, at a speed which was not reasonable and prudent under the circumstances, without keeping a proper or any lookout and without yielding the
right of way to Kanon is substantial evidence supporting
a finding that the defendant violated the reckless driving
statute.
The defendant was driving a large truck between 3G
and 40 miles per hour along Second West Street until
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he arriYed at the intersection of that street and Ninth
South at "~hich time the truck 'vas slowed down to some
extent. He made a left hand turn into traffic coming
in the opposite direction. The intersection was welllighted. From the fact that he neither applied his
brakes nor made any attempt to avoid hitting Kanon indicates at least that he did not
. see Kanon. Kanon was
there, however. He should have seen him. There is no
reason for his failure to see him unless he was not looking. At least the jury could reasonably infer that defendant was not looking. Defendant was under a very
positive duty to determine whether there was any traffic
crossing that intersection and going in an opposite direction before making that left hand turn. This he did
not do. He just sailed through the intersection and across
the path of oncoming traffic. The force of the impact is
shown by the condition of the deceased after the impact.
Defendant then continued on 157 feet before he brought
the truck to a stop.
\Ve submit that making this left hand turn under
the conditions then existing, is substantial evidence of a
violation of the reckless driving statute.
(d.) Defendant's conduct was reckless and evinced
a marked disregard for the safety of others.

Under the case of State vs. Lingman, 97 Utah 180,
91 J>. (2) 457 (1939) in order to sustain a conviction of
involuntary manslaughter there must be not only substantial evidence of an unlawful act committed by the
defendant hut therP 1nust also be substantial evidence
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that the conduct of the defendant was reckless or evinced
a marked disregard for the safety of others. The trial
court recognized this rule and the jury under Instruction
Six was required to so find beyond a reasonable doubt
before returning a verdict of guilty in this case. The
jury certainly found beyond a reasonable doubt that the
conduct of defendant was reckless and evinced a marked
disregard for the safety of others.
Were they justified in so

finding~

What has been said under (c) above on reckless driving applies to this point now under consideration. For
emphasis we again say; the defendant was driving in an
intersection whereon traffic was directed by a semaphore. When he entered that intersection the defendant
knew that north and south bound traffic were to proceed
through the intersection. To make a left hand turn he
knew that he would be crossing the path of traffic which
had a right to proceed across the intersection. He was
changing his course. His speed should have been such
that this large truck was under such control that he could
stop it to avoid colliding with north bound traffic. He
should have looked to see if there was any north bound
traffic which would obstruct the path of his truck. It
was his duty to yield to any vehicle which was within the
intersection or so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard. Defendant obviously disregarded hifl
duties aforesaid, at least there is substantial evidence
that he did. He made the left hand turn, hit Kanon who
was going north, and proceeded on east on Ninth South
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157 feet. This conduct '"'as certainly reckless, it evinced
a marked disregard for the safety of others. The jury
so found. This Court should not upset this finding.

(e) .Authorities relating to the sufficiency of the
eridence.
A reading of the instructions in the case discloses
that the rules laid down in State vs. Lingman, supra,
were closely followed by the trial court. The instructions were given upon the theory that the case came
under the so-called arm (a) of the involuntary manslaughter statute. That is, to convict, the jury must
find an unlawful act plus reckless conduct or conduct
evincing a marked disregard for the safety of others.
This rule for the sufficiency of evidence or the elements
of the crime of which defendant was found guilty is clear
and there can be no question but \Vhat the trial court had
the correct rule in mind. The only question here is its
application to the facts in the case at bar, or put in
another way, are the facts in this case sufficient to
comply with the rule.
In the foregoing discussion of the facts, we believe
we have demonstrated that there is substantial evidence
in the record from which the jury might reasonably find
that defendant committed one or more unlawful acts
and that his conduct in so doing was reckless and evinced
a marked disregard for the safety of others.
As might be expected the decisions relating to the
sufficiency of evidence in involuntary manslaughter
cases are not very helpful as far as facts are concerned.
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Each case is decided upon its own perculiar facts and
circumstances and in most all jurisdictions the court then
determines whether or not, in their opinion, the facts in
the record are such that the jury was justified in finding
recklessness or a disregard for the safety of others.
We will cite a few cases wherein rules are laid down
which we believe are applicable to the case at bar. As
shown by the case of People vs. Smaszcz, 344 Ill. 494, 176
N. E. 768 ( 1931), it is not necessary that an eye witness
testify to the speed of an automobile of the accused in
order to justify a finding that it vvas going at an excessive rate of speed at the time of the fatal collision. If
an unreasonable speed can be determined from the force
of the impact, the severity of the injuries sustained, the
distance travelled after the impact by the automobile or
automobiles involved, etc., it is sufficient to support a
verdict based thereon. See also State vs. Bedinger, 126
N. J. L. 288, 19 A. (2) 322 (1941).
To have had his car under proper control the defendant should have been operating it at such a speed
and with such attention to it as would enable him to
bring it to a stop with a reasonable degree of quickness
or within a reasonable distance and to guide it safely
around objects on the highway. State vs. Elliott, (Del.}
8 A. ( 2) 873. Certainly within this definition of proper control the evidence was that the defendant did not con1ply
with his duty to have the truck under proper control.
He could not stop his truck with any degree of quickness
or within a reasonable distance. The evidence that he
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did not stop it 'vith any degree of quickness and within
a reasonable distance is certainly substantial evidence
that he could not so stop it.

People vs. Przybyl, 365 Ill. 515, 6 N. E. (2) 848, laid
down a similar rule. In that case the defendant passed
another car going in the same direction that he was
going and then hit and killed a pedestrian who was
crossing the street. Apparently the defendant could
not see what was on the other side of this car as he
passed it. The court said that he was under a duty to
have his car under such control that he could avoid a
collision with any person crossing the street and that
his failure to do so was an utter disregard of the safety
of others. In other words, in that case the defendant
might well expect that someone would be crossing the
street and that he could not be able to see it because of
the other car. Since the defendant there could have expected such a situation the court held that he was under
a duty to have his car in such control that he could avoid
hitting a person who might be expected on the street.
In the case at bar, the defendant certainly could
expect that there would be north bound traffic as he
attempted to make the left hand turn. Hence he should
have had his car under such control that he could avoid
colliding vvith any such north bound traffic. His failure
~o to do under the authority of the Przybyl case constitutP<l an utter disregard for the safety of others.

'OS.

Another case vvhich applies a similar rule is Cornett
CoJJnnornrealth, 282 Ky. 322, 138 S. W. (2) 492 (1940) .

•
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In that case the court held that where a defendant was
driving between 30 and 35 miles per hour on a highway
and approached children playing with a ball on the edge
of the highway the ball is likely to get out of their control
and the defendant should therefore bring his car under
such control as to avert an accident if a child should
dart in front of his automobile. His failure to have his
car under such control would be such recklessness as to
make the case a question for the jury.
In the case at bar the defendant did not have his
truck under the control as required by the foregoing
cases, and we submit that such being the case he violated
the speed statute requiring him to have his truck under
immediate control.
It is axiomatic that to violate a speeding statute
such as that in Utah it is not necessary that the accused
should drive his automobile in excess of a prescribed
speed such as in excess of 25 miles per hour in a residential district. Circumstances and conditions may make
a speed unlawful which otherwise would be lawful. State
vs. Goldstone, 144 Minn. 405, 175 N. W. 892 (1920);
People vs. Van Echartsberg, 133 Cal. App. 1, 23 P. (2)
819 (1933); Mulkern vs~ State, 176 Wis. 490, 187 N. W.
190 (1922); State vs. Mills, 181 N. C. 530, 106 S. E. 677
(1921).
In State vs. Elliott, supTa, it is pointed out that
the person operating a vehicle must maintain constant}~·
a proper lookout for persons or other vehicles, and the
duty to look requires the duty to see that 'vhich i~ in
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plain sight, unless some reasonable explanation is offered. It is negligence not to see what is plainly visible
\vhen there is nothing to obstruct the vision of the driver,
for he is required not only to look but is required to
exercise his sense of sight in such a careful and intelligent manner as \vill enable him to see what a person
in the exercise of the ordinary care and control would
see under the circumstances.
In State vs. Biewen, 169 Iowa 256, 151 N. W. 102,
it was held that where a driver of an automobile has
an unobstructed view of a person upon the highway
and there is no obstacle to turning aside to avoid a
collision and a collision occurs with such other person,
a death resulting from such collision may be found to be
a consequence of such driver's recklessness. The court
held that it made no difference whether the driver saw
such person or not because if he did not see that person
he should have done.
In People vs. il!cKeon, 236 N.Y. S. 591 (1929), the
defendant was convicted of reckless driving and appealed on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient.
The defendant was proceeding north on a highway and
his car collided with a car driving south. Defendant had
n1ade a sharp turn to the left in order to go west on an
intersectional high\vay and he hit the car of the injured
person. The court upheld the conviction based upon
this evidence and with relation to the defendant's duty
it ~tated:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
''Whenever a driver on a highway intends to
make a left turn, he must take every precaution
in making that turn so as not to endanger traffic
coming in the opposite direction, for the left turn
swings him directly in front of traffic lawfully
proceeding on the right side of the thoroughfare.''
2. NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR WAS MADE BY
THE COURT IN GIVING HIS INSTRUCTIONS NOR
IN REFUSING TO GIVE CERTAIN REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIONS.
No error was committed by the court in instructing on right of w.ay.
(a.)

Instruction Number Five contains the instruction
on right of way and is the paragraph therein numbered
"Fifth". Counsel contends that the giving of the instruction on the subject of right of way was erroneous
because there was no evidence that the defendant failed
to yield the right of way or that the Kanon boy had
the right of way, and for the further reason that the
entire statute relating to right of way was not placed
in the instruction. We have heretofore indicated the
evidence on which the State relies as substantially tending to show that the defendant did fail to yield the
right of way and we refer the Court to Point 1 (b).
Counsel contends that the Kanon boy had lost his
right of way because of the fact that he violated the
law in two particulars: ( 1) in failing to have a light
on his bicycle and ( 2) in failing to keep on the right
side of the road. It is unquestionable that the evidence
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is to the effect that Kanon had no light on his bicycle
but w'e do not believe that as a matter of law the Court
can say that Kanon thereby lost his right of way. If the
defendant SR\V him "rould this Court for one minute
hold that Adan1son could run him down at will or that
he could take the right of way from Kanon although
Kanon was then 'vithin the intersection or so close
thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard~ The
Court would have to go this far in order to hold that
this right of \vay instruction should not have been given.
Counsel also claims that Kanon lost his right of
way because he violated a city ordinance and a state
statute requiring persons to drive as closely as practicable to the right hand edge or curb of a highway. The
ordinance by its wording particularly applies to riders
of bicycles. The evidence is that Kanon was riding within two or three feet of the curb of Second \Vest south
of Ninth South. He had not driven to the east of the
line at the time he was hit by the defendant. Counsel
apparently contends that it was the duty of Kanon
under this statute and ordinance to drive in a northeast
direction across the intersection. It is submitted that
this is not the proper interpretation of the statute or
ordinance. There was no curb or edge of the highway
in the middle of this intersection and hence no evidence
that Kanon in any way violated the law.
Counsel cites Dixon vs. Berg~in, 64 Ut. 195, 228 P.
7~~ (1024). In that case the accident did not occur in
the intersection but in the middle of the block. The
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evidence shows that the. plain tiff was from 25 to 27
feet from the edge or curb of the highway. Certainly
it is not like the case at bar where Kanon was driving
his bicycle as closely as practicable to the right hand
edge or curb of the highway.
We do not believe that the Court erred in leaving
out the latter part of the right of way. statute, Section
57-7-31, R. S. U. 1933. The following is the part of the
statute which was left out of the court's instruction:
''but such driver having so yielded and having given a signal when and as required by law
may n1ake such left turn, and other vehicles
approaching the intersection from the opposite
direction shall yield to the driver making the
left turn. ' '
There was no evidence of any kind in the record
from which the jury could have made any finding in
relation to this portion of the statute. Counsel states
that the evidence is to the effect that the defendant
yielded within the meaning of this statute and the Kanon
boy thereby lost his right of way. Of course, there is
evidence that the defendant slowed down but certainly
that is no evidence that he had yielded the right of way
to vehicles 'vhich were within the intersection or so clo~e
as to constitute an immediate hazard. Another thing
that should be noted is that the defendant did not obtain
the right of way until he both yielded and gave a signal
as required by law to make a left hand turn. Of course,
there is absolutely no evidence in the record of such
signal being given and that being true the above quotr(l
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portion of the statute was properly taken out of the
instruction given by the court.
(b.) ~ 0 error was committed by the Court in refusing tlze requested instructions of the defendant pertaining to the conduct of the deceased as the proximate
cause of the accident.
1

This point requires a consideration of the rule
relating to the contributory negligence of a deceased
person in an involuntary manslaughter case.
One of the leading cases in this country on this
proposition is the case of State vs. Campbell, 82 Conn.
671, 74 Atl. 927, 135 Am. St. Rep. 293, 18 Ann. Cas. 236
(1910). In that case it was clearly held that contributory
negligence is no defense in an involuntary manslaughter
case. In that case it was pointed out that the court did
not eliminate the deceased's conduct from the case. The
court stated :
"The court properly said to the jury that the
State must clearly show that the deceased's death
vvas the direct result of the defendant's negligence, but that the injured man's conduct became
material only as it bore upon the question: of
such negligence of the accused, and that if the
culpable negligence of the accused was the cause
of l\I r. ~I organ's death, the accused was responsible under the criminal law, whether Mr. Morgan's failure to use due care contributed to his
injury or not.''
Another leading case on this subject is the case of
Schnlt.z ,,_~. State, 89 Neb. 34, 130 N. W. 972, 33 L. R. A.
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(N. S.) 403, Ann. Cas. 1912 C. 495 (1911). The court
stated:
''Contributory negligence as such is not available as a defense in a criminal prosecution for a
homicide caused by the gross and reckless misconduct of the accused, although the decedent's
behavior is admissible in evidence, and may have
a material bearing upon the question of the
defendant's guilt. If, however, the culpable negligence of the accused is found to be the cause
of the decedent's death, the former is responsible
under the criminal law whether the decedent's
failure to use due care contributed to the injury
or not.''
It should be noted that in the case of Pe~ople vs.
Campbell, 237 Mich. 244, 212 N. W. 97, cited by appellant, the conduct of the deceased person was eliminated
from the case by the court's instruction. The trial
court instructed the jury that as a matter of law the
defendant was not guilty of contributory negligence. The
court held that the negligence of the deceased is only
material if it bears upon the negligence of the defendant.
This case holds that the contributory negligence is no
defense.
In People vs. Barnes, 182 Mich. 179, 148 N. vV. 400,
another case cited by appellant, the trial court subinittP<l
the case to the jury on the bald proposition that if at
the time the defendant struck the deceased he was
operating a car in excess of ten miles an hour he \Yn~
guilty of manslaughter for there 'vas no doubt that
defendant's car struck and ran over the deceased and
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caused her death. It was held that this was reversible
error. So far as the quotation is concerned on page 36
of appellant ~s brief there can be no question that the
conduct of the deceased is relevant and should not be
eliminated from the case. It is apparent that the conduct of the defendant in the case at bar was not eliminated.
In People vs. Hurley, 13 Cal. App. (2) 208, 56 P. (2)
978, the court was considering only the question of the
sufficiency of the evidence in that case to support a
verdict of guilty of manslaughter. The court in determining whether or not the defendant's conduct was
reckless took into consideration the conduct of the deceased. This case and State vs. Sisneros, 42 N. M. 500,
82 Pac. (2) 274, merely stand for the proposition that
the jury should take into consideration the conduct of
the deceased in determining the question of proximate
causation and also on the question of the negligence
of the defendant. The other cases cited by counsel for
appellant are to the same effect.
We will take up these requested instructions in the
order in which they appear in appellant's brief. The
first one is Requested Instruction No. 15. The first
sentence is "you are instructed that a driver may
presume that others in the road will conduct themselves
in a lawful manner." We do not believe that the foregoing statement is a proper one to place in an instruction
to the jury. See State vs. Campbell, supra. The balance
of this instruction is to the effect that if Kanon was
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riding his bicycle- in an unlawful manner and it was
because of his so riding in an unlawful manner that the
defendant failed to see him, then the defendant did not
act unlawfully in failing to yield to Kanon. We believe
this instruction too general in not informing the jury
what unlawful conduct of the deceased would bring about
such a result.
In Blackford vs. Kaplan, 135 Ohio St. 268, 20 N. E.
(2) 522 (1939), the trial court had refused to give the
following requested instruction:
"You are instructed that if you find that the
defendant in approaching or entering the intersection where the collision in this c'ase took place
was not proceeding in a lavvful manner, he therefore did not enjoy any preferential status or
privilege over the driver of the other car which
the statute of Ohio might have otherwise given
him.''
It was held that the request was objectionable because it did not in any way explain what act would be
unlawful and work a forfeiture. The court pointed out
that it should not be left to the jury to determine what
was or what was not unlawful. In this Blackford case
a requested instruction similar to the first sentence of
Requested Instruction No. 15 was held to be properly
refused.
Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 20 'v~uld
have been instructing the jury as to the contents of a
Salt Lake City ordinance to the effect that hiescles
upon a city street should drive as closely as practicable
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to the right hand edge or curb of the street. Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 21 was that if Kanon
was not following as closely to the right hand side of
the street as practicable then the jury should find that
he did not have the right of way. It is submitted that
there was no evidence that would justify either of these
last two requested instructions. The only evidence was
to the effect that Kanon was as close to the right hand
curb as \Yas practicable as long as there was a curb
where he was riding. He certainly did not make a right
hand turn to follow the curb line as he entered the
intersection of Second West Street and Ninth South,
but we do not believe that these ordinances and statutes
required such conduct.
Requested Instructions No. 12, 13 and 14 relate to
the failure of Kanon to have a light on his bicycle.
These instructions tell the jury that the law requires a
lighted lamp on a bicycle and that if Kanon was riding
without a lighted lamp it was unlawful and if found to
be the proximate cause of his death the defendant should
be acquitted, that the failure to have a light should be
considered in connection with all other matters pertaining to the accident. We submit that the contents and
subject matter of the requested instructions No. 12 to
l.f were sufficiently presented to the jury by the instructions given. The conduct of Kanon was in no way
elilninated from the case.
In Instruction No. 7A the court specifically instructe(l the jury that they should consider the conduct
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of Kanon together with all the other facts and circumstances surrounding the accident and that if his conduct
was the sole proximate cause of his death then the
defendant should be acquitted. The question in this
case was whether or not the reckless conduct of the
defendant caused the death. If it in any way contributed
to the death of Kanon then the defendant is guilty of
the crime of Involuntary Manslaughter. By Instruction
No. 6 the jury was required, before they could return
a verdict of guilty, to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that the conduct of the defendant caused the death. The
jury found the defendant guilty and of necessity found
that it was the defendant's conduct which caused the
death. Such finding, of course, is also a finding that the
conduct of the deceased Kanon was not the sole proximate cause of his own death.
Based upon similar reasoning courts have held that
it is not necessary to instruct the jury on unavoidable
accident. In other words, if a jury is required to find
that the reckless conduct of an accused caused the death
before returning a verdict of guilty, then when they
do return a verdict of guilty they have, of necessity,
excluded the existence of unavoidable accident in the
case. See State vs. Richardson, 216 Iowa 809, 249 N. vY.
211 (1933); Bowen vs. State, 100 Ark. 232, 140 S. \Y.
28 (1911); State vs. Murphy, 324 ~f o. 183, 23 S. W. (2)
136 (1929).
In State vs. Richardson, supra, the court stated :
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''The omission of any specific reference therein (instructions) to the so-called theory of the
defendant that the unfortunate death of the youth
was due to unavoidable accident and not to criminal negligence is fully, in effect, covered by the
instruction. The jury 'vas clearly told that to
justify a conviction it was incumbent upon the
state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant at the time was operating his automobile in a careless, heedless and negligent n1anner in willful or wanton disregard of the safety
of others.
Further the court told the jury that to justify
a conviction it was incumbent upon the state
to also prove that the defendant was guilty of
criminal negligence in the manner in which and
the speed at which he drove his car. This language
clearly eliminated the possibility of a conviction
if the act charged was the result of unavoidable
accident. The jury could not, upon any theory
of fair reasoning, have believed that the defendant was free from criminal negligence and have
returned a verdict of guilty. The jury must have
understood that unavoidable accident possesses
none of the elements of criminal negligence or of
willfulness, heedlessness and wantonness. The
point here urged by appellant is also without
substantial merit.''
Following the reasoning of these cases, the jury
could not have believed that the conduct of Kanon was
the sole proximate cause of his own death where it
returned a verdict of guilty and in so doing was required
to find that the conduct of the defendant caused the
death.
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In People vs. Marconi, 118 Cal. App. 683, 5 P. (2)
974 (1931) the court stated:
''The requested instruction is faulty in that it
could be understood as conveying the idea that
contributory negligence is a defense, which it is
not, People vs. McKee 80 Cal. App. 200, 251 P.
675; People vs. Leutholtz 102 Cal. App. 493, 283
P. 292, Note in 67 A. L. R. 922. * * * * The
court did admonish the jury that the defendant
was not responsible unless the death was caused
by his own act or omission, thus more correctly
covering the point appellant sought to cover.''
In People vs. Pociask, 14 Cal. (2) 679, 96 P. (2)
788 (1939) it was held that an instruction, that the
negligence of deceased was no defense, that such negligence would exonerate only if it was the sole proximate
cause of the accident but that the defendant was not
exonerated if the jury found that he was guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to the injuries,
correctly covered the law on the subject of the deceased's
conduct. To the same effect see State vs. Phelps, 153
Kan. 337, 110 P. (2) 755 (1941).
In State vs. Graff, (Iowa) 290 N. W. 97 (1940) the
following instruction was held to correctly state the law:
"You are instructed that the negligent or
careless act of the deceased, if any, or of persons
other than defendant, if any, that might have
contributed to the death of said deceased, ·will
not relieve the defendant of criminal responsibility if the death of said deceased was naturally
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before defined in such a manner as to show a
wanton or reckless disregard and indifference
to the safety of others 'vho might be reasonably
expected to be injured thereby.''
In State rs. Wilbanks, 168 La. 861, 123 So. 600
(1929) it 'vas held that there was no error in refusing
the following requested instructions :
"(1) That it is unlawful for an automobile
to operate upon the public roads without lights;
and that it is also a violation of the law for a
horse-drawn vehicle to operate upon any of the
roads etc., without a light that can be seen 500
feet away. (2) That if you find that the failure
to have lights on the buggy was the cause of
the accident, or if you find that if the buggy had
lights on it the accident would not have occurred
you must acquit.''
In that case the defendant's automobile ran into
a buggy. The defendant's automobile was being driven
at night without lights.
In Pratt vs. State, (Ala. App.) 171 So. 393 (1936)
the defendant requested an instruction that if the jury
had a reasonable doubt as to whether the deceased was
guilty of negligence which proximately caused his death
that it must acquit. The court held that contributory
negligence is no defense and that the request was properly refused.
Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 16 is an
abstract instruction. It is not in any way made applicable to the case at bar. Is it applicable to the defendant's
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negligence or to the question of proximate cause~ 'Ve
submit that a general and abstract instruction such as
this could not in any way aid the jury in their deliberation and its refusal was not error.
Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 10 was properly refused. The only persons involved in the accident
were the defendant and Kanon. Just why a general
instruction of this kind should be given is not evident.
The law with relation to proximate cause was fully set
out in the instructions given. The instructions properly
limited the deliberations of the jury on the question of
proximate causation to the proposition of whether the
conduct of the defendant or that of Kanon caused the
death.
Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 17 is similar
to No. 16, above mentioned, and for the same reasons
the trial court properly refused to give such request.
Defendant's Requested Instructions No. 18 and 19
relate to the claimed failure of Kanon to keep as close
to the right hand curb or edge of the highway. There
was no evidence that he did not so drive his bicyclP
and hence these requests were properly refused.
We submit that the jury was clearly instructed
concerning all of the law applicable to the issues of the
case at bar. In Instruction No. 6 the jury was clearly
told that before it could convict the defendant it n1u~t
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant \vhile
operating his automobile violated one of the statutes set
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forth in Instruction No. 5, that his conduct in so doing
was reckless or evinced a marked disregard for the
safety of others and that his said conduct was the
proximate cause of the collision between his automobile
and Kanon. In Instruction No. 7 the jury were particularly instructed that if it believed that the acts or conduct of the defendant in no way proximately caused
the collision of his automobile and Kanon and the injuries to Kanon then it must return a verdict of not
guilty. By Instruction No. 7-A the jury was told that
in determining the guilt of the defendant it must take
into consideration the conduct of Kanon and if it believed
such conduct to be the sole proximate cause of his death
then it must acquit the defendant.
'Ve submit that the foregoing instructions stated the
law as set forth in the cases cited in this brief and in that
of appellant.
(c.) The burden of proof was not cast up,on the
defendant and no prejudicial error was committed in
giving Instruction No. 7-A.

Instruction No. 7-A set forth the law as follows:
"You are instructed that in determining whether
or not the defendant is guilty of the crime
charged in the information you should consider
the conduct, insofar as there is evidence thereof,
of Sylvester Kanon immediately prior to the
accident and at the time of the accident together
\vitlt all the other facts and circumstances surrounding the accident which have been given in
evidence. If you believe from all the evidence
in the case that the sole proximate cause of the
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InJuries to and the death of the said Sylvester
Kanon was a result of the acts and conduct of the
said Sylvester Kanon then you should return a
verdict of not guilty."
Appellant took his exception to this instruction as
follows:
''Mr. McKay: Comes now the defendant and
excepts to the Court's instructions to the jury
as given, as follows: *** Excepts to Instruction
No. 7-A, and the whole thereof''. ( R. 134, 135).
The instruction contains two distinct propositions
of law: (1) That in determining the guilt of the defendant the jury should consider the conduct of Kanon
and (2) that if it believed the conduct of Kanon was
the sole proximate cause of his death then it should
acquit the defendant.
There can be no question but that the :first proposition of law contained in said instruction is correct and
was properly given. In fact defendant requested that
that proposition of law be given to the jury. Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 9.
It is well established that where exception is taken
to the whole of an instruction containing two or n1ore
propositions of law and one of said propositions is
correct then the Supreme Court will not reverse the
case because one of the other propositions of law 1nay
be incorrect. An error cannot be predicated upon such
an exception. State vs. Warner, 79 Ut. 500, 291 P. 307
(1930); State vs. McNaughton, 92 Ut. 99, 58 P. (2) rl,
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92 Ut. 11±, 66 P. (2) 137 (1936); State vs. Riley, 41
Ut. 225, 126 P. 29± (1912).

The reason for this rule is obvious. Exceptions
are taken to give the trial court an opportunity to correct any errors made in the instructions. By specifically
pointing out the latter portion of the instruction it may
be that the trial court would have been advised of the
contention of the appellant. It was not pointed out to the
trial court that it was the second sentence of said Instruction No. 7-A that defendant contended was incorrect.
We also submit that the wording of this instruction
was brought about by appellant's counsel. A number
of requests were made by said counsel on the question
of the conduct of Kanon. Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 13 was as follows:
"You are instructed that if you find that at
the time of the accident Sylvester Kanon was
riding a bicycle which was not equipped with a
lighted lamp, that such riding was unlawful, and
if you find that his so riding was the proximate
cause of his death you must find the defendant
not guilty."
It will be noted that the wording of this request
IS identical with the last sentence of Instruction No.
7-A. Both are to the effect that if the jury believes
that the conduct of Kanon was the proximate cause
of his death then they must find the defendant not
guilty. Defendant's Requested Instruction Nos. 11, 14,
1;\ 18, 1f) and 21 are similarly "\VOrded.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

38

The trial court in preparing his instructions had
before him these requests and rather than give these
particularized requests he stated in one instruction to
the jury that if it believed the conduct of Kanon was
the sole proximate cause of his death then it should
acquit the defendant. This followed the wording of the
requests made by the defendant. He should not now
be permitted to say that the trial court erred in following the wording of said requests.
By said Instruction No. 7-A, the trial court was not
attempting to fix the burden of proof. The jury ·was
told on more than one occasion in said instructions that
the burden was upon the State to prove the elements
of the offense to the satisfaction of the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt. The jury was specifically told that
it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed an unlawful act evincing a marked disregard for the safety of others which proximately caused
the death of Kanon before it could convict the defendant. If the jury could not so find it was specifically
instructed that it could not convict the defendant.
No. 7-A states the jury must acquit defendant if it
believes Kanan's conduct caused the death. This is a
correct statement of law. C~rtainly it is the lavv that if
the jury so believed it was duty bound to acquit the
defendant. The instruction did not go the next step anrl
state that if the jury had a reasonable doubt as to whether Kanon 's conduct was the sole proximate cause of llis
death then defendant should be acquitted. Appellant
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never did request the court to give an instruction on
this latter subject ·w·herein this matter would be specifically called to the jury's attention. The failure to so
instruct cannot no\v be raised by defendant, he should
have made such a request.
The burden of proof was by the instructions placed
upon the state to prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt and this burden was never changed or shifted
by the instructions.
In light of the foregoing circumstances, it is submitted that State vs. Laris, 78 Ut. 183, 2 P. (2) 243,
cited by appellant, is not in point.
Appellant claims undue emphasis is laid upon the
proposition that to justify acquittal the conduct of Kanon
must be the sole proximate cause of the death. That
such is the law is clear from the cases cited in appellant's brief and also this brief dealing with the question
of the contributory negligence of the deceased.
(d.)

There was no error in the trial court's refusal
to give defendant's Requested Instruction No. 3 defining
''without due caution or circumspection.''
The jury was instructed in accordance with State
vs. Lingman, s~tpra, that to find the defendant guilty
of involuntary manslaughter that it must find that the
conduct of the defendant was reckless or evinced a
Inarked disregard for the safety of others. (See In~truetion No. 6.)
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In Instruction No. 10 the jury was told that in the
case at bar there must be a union or joint operation
of an unlawful act and criminal negligence. Criminal
negligence is there correctly defined.
We submit that the jury was very clearly instructed
on the matter requested by defendant in his request No.
3 and to have given that request would not have improved the clarity of the instructions. They were clear
and definite.
CONCLUSION
Substantial evidence of the defendant's guilt was
introduced in this case, the instructions to the jury
correctly stated the law and defined the issues and the
jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged. No errors were
committed and the defendant's rights were in no way
prejudiced but were fully protected. We submit the
verdict and judgment of the court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
GROVER A. GILES,
Attorney General
ZAR E. HAYES,
His Deputy
BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS,
District Attorney
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